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Longevity Risk Management 
in Singapore’s National Pension System 
 
Joelle H.Y. Fong, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Benedict S. K. Koh  
 
While defined contribution (DC) pensions have enjoyed varying degrees of success 
during the accumulation phase, proponents of the DC model now confront the larger question of 
how participants will manage their capital throughout the payout phase so as not to run out of 
money in retirement.  Not surprisingly, governments have become involved in this decision, as in 
the case of Switzerland where annuitization is the default payout modality; given a choice, most 
retirees elect to annuitize (Bütler and Teppa 2007). The U.K. has a long history of annuitization 
for those holding private DC pension accounts, yet retirees have substantial leeway over how 
much to annuitize and when (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004). And in Chile, workers have 
long been given a choice between phased withdrawal and annuitization when they claim their 
pensions (Mitchell and Ruiz 2010).   
In contrast to such flexibility over annuitization, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) of 
Singapore has recently announced that retirement assets held by its citizens in the national 
defined contribution plan must be mandatorily annuitized so as to better protect retirees against 
the possibility of outliving their wealth. At the same time, the government has decided to enter 
the insurance market as a provider for these annuities. This paper evaluates the money’s worth of 
privately-offered annuities prior to the reform, discusses the impact of the government mandate, 
and assesses how the entry of the government as an annuity provider is shaping the nation’s 
insurance markets.  Our results are of interest for several reasons. First, the CPF is widely 
acknowledged as one of the world’s largest – and arguably most successful – defined 
contribution schemes. Accordingly it is valuable to see how this system is handling the 
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challenges of a rapidly aging population. Second, we seek to determine whether market failure – 
i.e. low value-for-money annuities – prompted the government to enter the insurance market as 
an annuity provider, and whether the new government-offered annuities will provide greater 
value to retirees.  
We show that competitively-priced life annuities were offered by private insurers in 
Singapore prior to the reform, with money’s worth ratios in the 0.88-1.05 range for males – on 
par with those in many other countries.  Moreover, adverse selection costs were reasonable, on 
the order of 3.3 to 5.6 percentage points. The new government-offered annuities are estimated to 
provide money’s worth ratios exceeding unity, benefitting annuitants on average but also 
implying that the annuity mandate will be expensive for the government if current pricing 
continues. 
These findings are relevant to the current debate about how to best deploy annuities to 
manage longevity risk, within the context of a defined contribution scheme. On the positive side, 
mandating annuitization can reduce loads and adverse selection and can help retirees better 
manage the risk of outliving their income, as detailed by Emms and Haberman (2008) and 
Horneff et al. (2008). Yet on the negative side, mandating can also pose challenges. For instance, 
making annuity purchase compulsory produces utility losses for less risk-averse retirees.1
                                                 
1 See for example, Mitchell et al (1999) and Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2003). 
 Also, 
if left to private annuity providers, market distortions can arise: for instance, in the U.K. Murthi, 
Orszag and Orszag (2000) describe falling annuity yields, high markups on annuities, and ‘mis-
selling’ incidents, which they attributed to a captive yet privately-run insurance market. By 
contrast, the Singaporean approach shows that a national government can both mandate and 
provide a risk-pooling scheme. Yet there are also risks in government provision, in that private 
insurers may be crowded out in the process. Indeed in Singapore, all but one of the eight private 
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insurers stopped selling CPF-compliant annuities between 2007 and 2009. Whether this crowd-
out effect is short-term or permanent remains an open question and an important one to address 
in future research. 
 
Background 
Established in 1955, the Central Provident Fund is the mainstay of Singapore’s old-age 
system. It is one of the world’s largest defined contribution schemes with about 3.23 million 
members; the program also faces a rapidly aging population due to one of the world’s lowest 
fertility rates (1.29 per female) and longest life expectancies (80.6 years at birth). 2
Prior to this reform, the government had established the concept of a Minimum Sum (MS) 
which required participants at age 55 to set aside for retirement a specific dollar value of assets 
from their total CPF accumulations;
 The 
government of Singapore has recently introduced the concept of a national longevity insurance 
scheme to address the challenges of increasing life expectancy given population aging (CPF 
2009a). As of 2013, annuitization, rather than the current phased withdrawal approach, will 
become the mandatory vehicle for a portion of CPF retirement saving under the auspices of the 
regulatory public agency known as the CPF Board. Under the CPF LIFE scheme, new annuity 
products began to be offered in September of 2009.  
3 excess accumulations could be withdrawn as a lump-sum.4
                                                 
2 Figures for year-end 2007 from the Singapore Department of Statistics (SDOS 2008a).  
 
3 The required Minimum Sum is set by the CPF and increases each year.  It was S$80,000 in 2003, S$99,600 in 
2007 and it is expected to be about S$134,000 in 2013 (CPF 2008 and 2009b).  
4 If a member’s total balance is higher than the Minimum Sum, any remaining balance can be withdrawn as a lump 
sum. If the total balance is less than the Minimum Sum, the following withdrawal rules currently apply to members 
who reach age 55 between 1/1/2010 and 6/30/2010:  if the balance ≤ $5,000 one may withdraw everything; if $5,000 
< total balance ≤ $16,667 one may withdraw $5,000 and set aside the remainder in the Retirement Account; and if 
$16,667 < total balance ≤ $167,143 one may withdraw 30% of the balance and set aside the remainder in the 
Retirement Account (CPF 2009c). 
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This Minimum Sum had to be preserved to age 65 (previously 62) before any drawdowns were 
permitted, and the default decumulation option after that was a phased withdrawal scheme 
paying benefits over about 20 years (or until the balance was exhausted).  This framework 
exposed participants to significant longevity risk, since about half of all age-65 members would 
be expected to outlive their assets (CPF 2008). Those having the full Minimum Sum amount in 
cash could voluntarily buy a life annuity from private insurers, but this group was a small 
fraction of the total. Among the active members who turned 55 in 2008, only about one-third had 
accumulated the required MS (CPF 2009b). And only one in six eligible to do so actually elected 
to buy an annuity from private insurers under the MS Scheme,5 perhaps because the phased 
withdrawal payout of S$790 was higher compared to an average monthly annuity payment of 
S$520.6
In 2007, the Singapore Government convened a National Longevity Insurance 
Committee (NLIC) to study the feasibility of the national longevity insurance scheme. After 
extensive hearings and review, it concluded:  
 Another reason might be costs; indeed Prime Minister Lee suggested as much in stating 
that “frankly speaking, the returns have not been very attractive, (and) the costs have been high.” 
(SPMO 2007).  
The operation of the scheme will involve significant mortality and investment 
risks over a very long time horizon….The committee notes the difficulties that 
some annuity providers abroad had run into when various risks were not properly 
managed. In some circumstances, provider risked insolvency as they were unable 
to meet liabilities... Members of the public have therefore expressed a preference 
of the CPF Board to administer the scheme due to the favorable CPF interest 
rates.…participants will need to have confidence in this national scheme to 
provide for their retirement, the operator must engender public trust and have 
strong administration capability” (CPF 2008).  
 
                                                 
5 See Fong et al. (2010). 
6 This applies to a member with the full Minimum Sum of $99,600 at age 55 (as of 2007) (CPF 2007). Under phased 
withdrawal, he could draw down his balance plus interest via monthly payouts of $790 and the flow would continue 
for 20 years at which point the balance is likely to be exhausted. 
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In other words, the Committee argued that the government should offer annuities due to greater 
public trust and perhaps greater efficiency, and indeed it is possible that a government-run 
pooling scheme could benefit from better annuity pricing through economies of scale and lower 
administrative loads. Furthermore, if it could become the primary provider, it could pool 
sufficient annuitants such that the average mortality risk of the pool would decrease. Mitigating 
these advantages include concern about whether the public sector would have sufficient in-house 
expertise and might crowd out commercial insurers. In any event, in February 2008, the 
government mandated life annuities and also required the CPF Board to operate a national 
longevity insurance scheme that would “give Singaporeans confidence that the scheme will be 
properly administered” (CPF 2008). Personnel from the Ministry of Manpower and the CPF 
Board devoted almost two years to design the system, consulting industry professionals in the 
process. The launch of the pilot program in September 2009 was accompanied by intensive 
public education through the media, road-shows, and pamphlets, and it generated substantial 
interest: since launch, over 30,000 members committed about S$1.5 billion to the CPF LIFE 
scheme (CPF 2010). 
In what follows, we assess whether unattractive annuity yields and high costs were, in 
fact, problematic in the Singaporean context and thus might rationalize government provision. 
 
Methodology: Modeling Money’s Worth Ratios  
A large literature focuses on measuring the money’s worth of annuities in Western 
countries. Consistent with that opus, we define the money’s worth ratio (MWR) of a payout 
annuity as the ratio of the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of annuity payments to the 
initial premium (Mitchell et al. 1999). Whereas a fairly priced annuity with no loadings will have 
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a MWR of unity, in the real world, privately-sold annuities have MWRs of less than one due to 
administrative costs and adverse selection.  Adverse selection occurs in a voluntary market since 
those who elect to purchase a payout annuity tend to live longer than those who do not; adverse 
selection raises prices for all those who do purchase. Adverse selection costs are computed as the 
difference between the MWRs using annuitant versus population survival tables (Mitchell et al. 
1999).  Many prior studies have used the MWR notion to measure value for money in a range of 
annuity products including constant and rising payout products, joint-and-survivor annuities, and 
annuities with guarantee periods (cf. Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown et al. 2001; Finkelstein and 
Poterba 2002, 2004; Thorburn et al. 2005). 
The annuities offered under the Singaporean CPF scheme are somewhat different from 
products on offer elsewhere, as they include a guaranteed amount if the death of the insured 
occurs in a specified time frame. Specifically, when the insured dies, the beneficiary receives the 
guaranteed amount of the single premium plus accrued interest (if any) less total amount of 
annuity payouts already made (if positive).7 The refund, which is a lump-sum payment to the 
beneficiary, provides an element of capital protection. 8
 
 Accordingly, the expected present 
discounted value (EPDV) of a nominal annuity with a guaranteed amount may be written as 
follows:  
 
 
                                                 
7 Accrued interest is accumulated from age 55 when the premium is paid to the point where payouts start (at age 62 
in 2007). Not all annuities incorporate the accrued interest component in the guaranteed amount on death.  Accrued 
interest ranges from 0% to 2.5% per annum in 2007; see Table 1. 
8 This is somewhat similar to the money-back annuities available in other countries. For example, value-protected 
annuities that were introduced in the U.K. in 2006 feature partial money-back option where the lump-sum death 
benefits are permitted up to age 75, and are taxed (Boardman 2006).  
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In Equation (1a),  is the age at which the annuity is purchased,  represents the number of 
months beyond the annuity start date,  refers to the fixed monthly nominal annuity payout for 
the individual purchasing the annuity at age ,  is the nominal discount rate at month t based 
on a riskless term structure, and  is the probability that an individual of age  survives after 
months. To account for the guarantee amount and the deferral period, we also define  to be 
the deferred period (expressed in months),  is the death benefit at time , and  
is the probability of an annuitant age a surviving to  months and then dying between month  
and month . The first term in Equation (1a) captures the guarantee amount to the 
beneficiary if the insured dies during the deferral period, while the second term reflects benefits 
paid to the insured if he lives to the point when payouts start. Alternatively, the formula can be 
more neatly presented per Equation (1b) where the first summation accounts for the death benefit 
arising from the money-back guarantee, and the second summation captures the annuity benefit 
over the lifetime of the individual: 
 
 
To implement the EPDV valuation for Singapore, we use the newly released population 
mortality tables from Singapore Statistics (SDOS 2008b) having a limiting age of 100; we then 
cohortize the population tables (as cohort mortality tables are unavailable) using period life 
tables. Thus having a year 2007 period life table, we compute: 
 
where  is the annual mortality rate for age x in year 2007,  is the 
estimated annual mortality rate for age  in year , and  represents the estimated 
annual mortality improvements for an individual aged  extrapolated from mortality changes 
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between 1990 and 2005. As in previous studies, mortality improvement rates are projected from 
the abridged period population tables for Singapore published by the World Health Organization 
(various years).  
Little is publicly known on actual annuitant mortality experience in Singapore. Insurance 
industry practice and previous research including Fong (2002) has adopted the UK annuitant 
mortality experience with adjustments for local conditions, similar to what is done in Australia. 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in its capacity as insurance regulator requires firms 
to employ the UK a(1990) Ultimate Tables rated down five years for reserves and liability 
valuations pertaining to annuities sold (MAS 2008a).9 Accordingly, we use the a(1990) tables 
with a five-year setback to estimate the annuitant experience for our valuation year, and then we 
cohortize the resulting annuitant tables.10
where is the cumulative probability of a person aged  surviving for  years, and  is the 
probability of a person age  dying within the year. These cumulative survival 
probabilities are sex-specific and calculated on a monthly basis to match the frequency of the 
annuity payouts. In addition, we apply a uniform distribution of deaths (UDD) assumption to 
reflect mortality patterns in Singapore. We justify using UDD for fractional ages within a year 
 We compute cumulative survival probabilities from the 
cohort tables as follows: 
 
                                                 
9 The Sixth Schedule of the Insurance Regulations 2004 stipulates that insurers may employ the rates in the UK a(90) 
tables with a five-year setback to value their annuity liabilities. Previously, Insurance Regulations 1992 required 
insurers to employ the a(1990) tables with a two-year setback. The a(1990) tables are constructed based on UK 
annuitants’ mortality experience from 1967-70 with mortality improvements projected to 1990.  By applying the 5-
year setback, we effectively age the tables to Year 2007 and then cohortize for the MWRs. 
10 As a robustness check, we verify that our calculations yield a lower mortality for annuitant cohort than the 
population cohort; for instance, a 65-year-old male in the general population has a mortality of 0.01028 compared to 
0.00933 for an annuitant.  
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due to the lack of variation in Singapore's weather (so death rates are unlikely to vary 
seasonally).11 We match the limiting age of the population group with that of the annuitant group 
by extrapolating population mortality estimates to the common maximum age of 117 to properly 
capture the longevity tail risk in the population group.12
Figure 1 compares the cumulative survival probabilities we derive for the general 
Singaporean population and for annuitants.  The Figure shows the probability that a 55-year old 
man (or woman) will survive to various ages given mortality rates for the population at large, as 
well as those for annuitants. Not surprisingly, the average 55-year old annuitant has a higher 
survival probability at all ages, implying some adverse selection costs to be discussed below.
 This improves comparability between 
the two groups by ensuring that a person drawn randomly from the population also has some 
probability of survival leading to annuity payouts even at the tail end, rather than being curtailed 
at 100 years of age.  
13
The EPDV calculation requires a term structure of interest rates; we judge the 
Singaporean Treasury bond rates as most appropriate since the MSS annuities are viewed as 
capital protected. Prices and yields of the Singapore Government Securities Treasury bonds 
obtained from MAS (2008b) are used to compute the riskless spot rates to proxy the yields on 
hypothetical zero coupon bonds.
 
14
                                                 
11 Various actuarial assumptions could be used for fractional ages within a year, including a uniform distribution of 
deaths, a constant force of mortality, or a hyperbolic pattern (Bowers et al. 1997). Prior studies on MWR have not 
explicitly specified assumptions for fractional ages within a year (e.g. Doyle et al. 2004). For a plot of our values of 
 derived from the UDD assumption, see Appendix 1.  
 To obtain the full term structure, we then linearly interpolate 
12 We use population period tables from Singapore Statistics. These tables had applied the Coale-Kisker method to 
project mortality at higher ages, using a separation factor of 0.5 (SDOS 2008b). Given qx for ages 85 -99, we back 
out the death rates (mx) and observe that the change in mx between each age interval is constant at about 9.3%. 
Extrapolating this constant graduation rate, we then derive the qx for ages 100 -117.  
13 Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) attributed these mortality differences largely to socio-economic, or passive, 
selection effects. 
14 The first year rate is derived from the 1-year Treasury bill; thereafter, the 2, 5, 7, 10, 15 and 20-year Treasury 
bond rates as of 2007 are used to estimate the riskless spot rates. Our annual spot rate ranges from 1.4% to 3.44%. 
Since maximum duration available is only 20 years, we then extrapolate the last spot rate into the future, yielding a 
nominal riskless term structure of interest rates on Singapore’s Treasury bonds. 
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between intervals where spot rates are unavailable, for instance between the 7- and 10-year spot 
rates.15
Figure 1 here 
   
 
Results: MWRs for Voluntary Private Annuities   
Prior to the mandatory annuity reform, plan participants with sufficient cash could 
voluntarily purchase a life annuity from 7-9 insurers participating in the market; the firms 
included some international players with Singaporean offices (e.g. AIA, Prudential, and HSBC 
Insurance), as well as several local insurers.16
                                                 
15 See Appendix 2 for a list of key inputs compared to those used in two earlier money’s worth studies for annuities 
in Singapore. 
 This program promoted annuity purchase among 
CPF participants; Fong (2002) estimated that as at 2000, about 87 percent of all Singapore 
annuitants had purchased their policies through this scheme. The annuity premium equaled the 
prevailing Minimum Sum for the year, and insurers were free to determine participant payouts 
and guarantee amounts. In 2007, for instance, in exchange for a lump-sum premium at age 55 of 
S$99,600, monthly annuity payouts beginning at age 62 varied as outlined in Table 1. The nine 
annuities on offer by eight commercial insurers were similar in that the standard deviation in 
payments was only about five percent. All annuities had fixed nominal payouts; two also 
promised a non-guaranteed annual bonus payment depending on the insurer’s performance. 
Level monthly payouts ranged from S$495-559 for males and S$441-514 for females; the 
guaranteed amount upon death was at least the premium S$99,600 and several annuities paid 
interest of 0.5-2.5%.  
16 As at Dec 2007, three insurers accounted for almost 80% of the total market share for individual annuity policies, 
inclusive of annuity purchases using non-CPF pension saving (MAS 2007). In particular, a home-grown co-
operative, NTUC Income, has long been the market leader with 58% market share and about 38,000 annuity policies 
in force as at end 2007. Great Eastern Life and UOB Life have approximately 11% market share each, higher than 
that of AIA (8.5%) and Prudential (1.6%).  
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Table 1 here 
Using these annuity quotes in Equation (1) generates the desired MWRs reported in 
Table 2. Here we see that, per premium dollar, the typical male annuitant would have anticipated 
receiving an average of $0.947 and the female $0.955 in 2007. It is also of interest that the 
NTUC Income co-operative offered the highest money’s worth ratios of 1.047(males) and 1.081 
(females); these exceeded the private insurer average by 10.5 and 13.1 percent, respectively.17
The reasonable adverse selection costs observed in the private annuity market in 
Singapore may be partly attributed to the unique characteristics of the MS Scheme annuities. For 
one thing, the premium guarantees contribute significantly to reducing adverse selection; indeed 
in results not reported here in detail, removing the embedded guarantee would increase adverse 
selection by 20-26 percent. Also important is the deferral period on these annuities (between 
ages 55 and the benefit-claiming age). Without this, adverse selection would have been higher by 
9-13 percent. In any case, the annuity marketplace prior to the most recent reform offered 
  
We measure the cost of adverse selection as the difference in the MWR using population versus 
annuitant tables.  Our values of 3.3–4.1 percentage points (or cents per $1 premium) for males 
and 4.2–5.6 for females are comparable to the U.K. figure of 4.6 reported by Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002) but below the 6 and 10 percentage points found for Australia and U.S. 
respectively (Doyle et al. 2004; Mitchell at al. 1999).  In terms of proportion, we see from the 
Table that adverse selection costs accounted for about 47% of the total loadings, which is quite 
reasonable compared to other countries. For example, in the U.S., Brown et al. (2001) found that 
roughly half of the cost of purchasing a voluntary annuity could be attributed to adverse selection. 
                                                 
17 NTUC Income is a non-profit oriented co-operative for the Workers’ Union. This result is consistent with NTUC 
Income’s mission to return the majority of profits to policyholders (NTUC Income 2009). 
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relatively competitively priced products, by world standards, with reasonable adverse selection 
costs.  
Table 2 here 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As noted earlier, annuitant mortality rates for Singapore are derived from UK annuitant 
tables, due to lack of annuitant experience in Singapore. To evaluate how sensitive our results 
are to variations in mortality, we modify the tables to allow life expectancy to vary by two years 
on either side of our base case estimates, dated from the year of purchase. The mortality of a 57-
year-old then represents a +2-year adjustment and the mortality of a 53-year-old represents a –2-
year adjustment. Results in Table 3 (Panel A) show that lightening mortality by two years 
exacerbates adverse selection, while the opposite holds when mortality is made heavier. In 
addition, the adjustments make slightly more difference to the adverse selection results for males 
than females. We also explore sensitivity to interest rate variations. The Singapore government 
bonds were used to derive the riskless term structure. The spot rate on the 20-year bond (3.44%) 
was used as a proxy for the long-term interest rate for periods beyond 20 years. Sensitivity 
testing using 50 and 100 basis points around the central case shows that money’s worth values 
are sensitive to these changes, as Table 3 (Panel B) indicates. In any event, our estimates of 
adverse selection remain robust. 
Table 3 here  
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Results: MWRs for Mandatory Annuities  
Under the new CPF LIFE scheme introduced in 2009, participants may either purchase a 
private annuity or select from a menu of government-offered annuity products called the CPF 
LIFE plans. Initially the intention was to provide a dozen different payout options outlined in 
2008, but the menu was later pared back to four plans in 2009 after public feedback suggested 
that too much choice was confusing.  The final four are known as CPF LIFE Basic, LIFE 
Balanced, LIFE Plus, and LIFE Income. Table 4 presents illustrative payouts for the various 
LIFE plans as the government’s proposals evolved, for an annuity premium of half the estimated 
Minimum Sum or S$67,000 in 2013.18
Table 4 here 
 For that premium, benefit payouts were initially set to be 
quite generous: in six of the 12 original plans proposed in early 2008, monthly payouts would 
have ranged from S$560-650 for males and S$540-590 for females. By September of 2009, when 
the final LIFE plans were launched, promised monthly payouts had been adjusted downward to 
about S$524-636 for men and S$500-553 for women.  
Table 4 also shows the ‘annuity component’ expressed as a percentage of the annuity 
premium. That is, the CPF LIFE products split the premium paid into a term and an annuity 
component. The first covers payouts from age 65 to the vesting age which differs across the 
plans; any unused balance from the term component and interest from it is fully refundable to 
one’s heirs. The annuity component finances payouts from the vesting age to death with no funds 
passed on to the beneficiary. Thus the four finalized LIFE plans provide a range of trade-offs, 
balancing providing for oneself and leaving a bequest for one's beneficiaries. In practice, the 
transition from the term to the annuity component is purely procedural and does not affect 
                                                 
18 By 2013, the prevailing Minimum Sum is expected to be about S$134,000 (S$99,600 in 2007). The CPF 
estimated that of the approximately 35,000 active members in the 2103 cohort of members turning age 55, about 60% 
will have at least S$67,000 in cash in their Retirement Accounts (CPF 2008). 
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monthly benefits to any CPF member in receipt, with the interest from the annuity component 
being non-refundable to individual participants as it funds the CPF LIFE scheme. In other words, 
interest forfeited represents participants’ opportunity cost of joining the LIFE plan. This cost is 
factored into the money’s worth computations by means of a guaranteed amount Gt that falls as 
the retiree ages. While the LIFE Plus and LIFE Income plans both have an annuity component, 
the LIFE Plus product permits some bequest whereas LIFE Income allows none.19
Since these annuities are being mandated, we generate money's worth values using 
Singapore population mortality tables. Results in Table 3 show that the government LIFE plans 
offer excellent value-for-money to annuitants. 
 A retiree who 
opts for the LIFE Income product received a higher monthly payout while alive, making the 
product most appealing to unmarried or childless individuals.  By comparison, the LIFE Basic 
plan provides for the highest bequest amount in exchange for the lowest monthly payouts by 
allocating most to the term component. The LIFE Balanced plan provides an intermediate mix.  
20
                                                 
19 The bequest on the LIFE Plus plan is the unused portions of the annuity component (which in this case is equal to 
the premium paid). In other words, the refund is the premium paid less annuity payouts already made. Members who 
join CPF LIFE may not withdraw unless they have medical grounds of shortened life expectancy, or if they are 
leaving Singapore and West Malaysia permanently with no intention of returning to either country. Members are 
also not allowed to change their LIFE plans after joining the scheme (CPF 2009d). 
 For instance, using the riskless term structure 
with a long-term rate assumption of 3.44 percent, MWRs range from 1.24-1.31 for males and 
1.26-1.34 for females. These values are far above those provided by the privately-provided life 
annuities where it will be recalled that mean MWRs were 0.947 for men and 0.955 for women 
(using annuitant mortality).  It might be thought that the interest rate environment in Singapore is 
20 Based on communications with the CPF Board, we also assume interest rates are compounded and credited 
annually to the Retirement Account (RA), but if the member dies in any month, any interest earned up to that point 
in time is immediately credited and so refunded. Even when a member reached vesting age, any unused balance in 
the RA continues to earn interest. If the member adds top-ups to the RA, this also forms part of the principal and 
earns interest. On death, any unused balance in the RA is refunded. For the original 12 plans, the extra 1% earned on 
the total MS is allocated pro-rata to the RA and pooled interest based on the component balances for each month. 
However, for the final four plans, the extra 1% earned on the total MS is allocated entirely to the RA. Finally, if the 
member dies after vesting age, any unused balance of the annuity component (except for the LIFE Income plan), 
will be refunded to his beneficiaries. 
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unusually low, so we recomputed the MWRs using a higher long-term rate of 4.44 percent (close 
to the yield of the longest-term 10-year bond in 1998); under these circumstances, the MWRs 
appear in brackets in the last four rows of Table 3. The higher interest rate assumption still yields 
MWRs of 1.10-1.15 for males and 1.09-1.14 for females. 
Looking at the patterns of benefit values, it is interesting to note that the LIFE Income 
(sans bequest) and LIFE Plus (low bequest) plans provide higher MWRs than do the other two 
plans, implying a small penalty if participants elect a plan that includes bequests.  Also it is 
apparent that as the design was fine-tuned over time, MWRs were dialed down; perhaps 
policymakers realized that the early pricing was overly generous. Yet even so, MWRs of the 
CPF LIFE payouts remain at or slightly above unity, compared to the lower values of private 
insurer annuities that had been available. The government’s higher payout results in part from 
lower administrative loads compared to those levied by private insurers, and in part from less 
adverse selection due to the compulsory annuitization (though above we had indicated this was 
relatively small in Singapore).21
As the administrator, the CPF Board determines the premium and payouts with advice 
from independent actuarial consultants, so the new design may intentionally include a small 
subsidy to CPF members so as to jump-start the new scheme. Indeed the government has offered 
a sign-on bonus (called the L-bonus) for the first five cohorts of members joining CPF LIFE for 
whom the scheme is voluntary.
 A long-term rate assumption set closer to historical norms also 
generates MWR values closer to one.   
22
                                                 
21 Similarly, in the U.S. context, Abel (1986) showed that because the U.S. Social Security system is compulsory, it 
is immune to adverse selection and a fully funded system can offer a rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate 
based on population average mortality. 
 Also our computations assume constant nominal payouts 
22 The L-Bonus is targeted at lower and middle-income CPF members age 46-50 in 2008. It is given to these 
members when they enroll in the CPF LIFE scheme at age 55. In fact, the LIFE Plus plan, which provides a higher 
monthly payout and leaves less bequest for beneficiaries has proven most popular in the pilot launch (CPF 2010); 
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though in fact, payouts may vary in the future, depending on the future evolution of interest rates 
and mortality.  Though the CPF Board can adjust payouts periodically to reflect actual mortality 
experience and investment return, it is noteworthy that it has assured members that adjustments 
will usually be small so that nominal payouts are anticipated to remain relatively stable over time 
(CPF 2009d).23
 
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
A topic of substantial interest to international policymakers is whether a national 
annuitization scheme should be administered by the private or the public sector.24
                                                                                                                                                             
over half of the members selected it. In addition, more than S$60 million of LIFE Bonus (L-Bonus) has been given 
to about 70% of the members for joining the scheme.  
  Having a 
single provider can reduce costs through economies of scale, and a government-run scheme may 
be perceived to be safer by retirees than private insurers which may face bankruptcy (Babbel and 
Merrill 2007). In the Singaporean case, the Civil Service is regarded as one of the most efficient 
bureaucracies in the world with a high standard of discipline and accountability (Heritage.org, 
2010) and the fact that the CPF has traditionally paid interest on annuities at a rate pegged to the 
10-year SGS bond plus 1 percent with a 2.5 percent floor implies that citizens tend to view such 
returns as risk-free (given the AAA rating of government bonds). It is therefore interesting that 
the annuities offered by Singapore’s CPF LIFE scheme appear to be priced very favorably to the 
consumer compared to other developed countries (see Table 5). Our preliminary evidence 
23 Responding to members seeking to join CPF LIFE ahead of the official launch date of 2013, the CPF Board began 
offering LIFE plans in September of 2009 to members born in 1954 or before.  Inasmuch as annuitization is not yet 
mandatory, this first phase of CPF LIFE operates on a voluntary opt-in basis (from 2013, annuitization will be 
mandatory). Younger members will be auto-included in the LIFE Balanced plan if they have at least $40,000 cash 
savings in their Retirement Account as of age 55. Members with less than S$40,000 can opt-in if they wish (CPF 
2009d).  The cut-off for auto-inclusion into CPF LIFE was selected to balance the level of monthly income and the 
percentage of active CPF members automatically included. At S$40,000, it is estimated that some 70% of active 
members will be automatically included from the first cohort (i.e. those who turn age 55 in 2013; CPF 2009f).   
24 Here we do not take up the question of whether mandatory annuitization is welfare-enhancing, a topic explored in 
some detail by Brown (2003).  
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therefore could indicate that Singapore has been able to pass cost savings from scale economies 
and onto annuitants. 
Table 5 here 
It is also worth noting that, while CPF members may still buy life annuities from a 
private insurer, few firms appear to be able to compete. That is, there were nine private insurance 
companies offering annuities in 2007, but only one remained by late 2009. The withdrawal of 
insurers from the annuity market may be of concern to policymakers if product innovation and 
pricing pressure requires competition among product providers in the industry. In addition, by 
marketing both life insurance and life annuities, insurers would be expected to benefit from some 
natural hedging across the two products. It is possible that private annuity providers could 
refocus their business outside the CPF scheme for retirees seeking to annuitize non-pension 
wealth. Also since the amount that CPF members can annuitize via the CPF LIFE product is 
capped at the stipulated Minimum Sum amount, wealthy individuals could still turn to 
commercial annuities. Moreover, the life annuities currently offered by the government are 
nominal and not inflation-adjusted and hence retirees may find some benefit from inflation-
linked payouts, not currently available under the CPF LIFE system.  
These findings are also of interest in nations where governments are increasingly 
concerned about annuitization in defined contribution plans. For instance, in the U.S. 401(k) 
pension marketplace, few retirees convert their assets into insured payout products and instead 
take their money as a lump sum (Brown et al. 2001).  In response, to protect against longevity 
risk, some have proposed making annuitization the default payout mechanism from a defined 
contribution pension.  For instance, Gale et al. (2008) recommend that 401(k) assets be 
automatically directed into a “trial” payout product unless the retiree affirmatively elects not to 
18 
 
participate. After 24 monthly payments from the automatic payout plan, the retiree could either 
do nothing and be defaulted into a permanent income distribution plan, or elect an alternative 
distribution option. By making it easier for retirees to purchase lifetime income plans, it is 
anticipated that these would become a better value for the average consumer. 
We conclude that Singapore’s recent move to mandate annuities under the national 
defined contribution pension system represents a logical step toward national longevity risk 
management. By establishing the government as an annuity provider, the CPF Board may have 
taken advantage of scale economies and reduced the pricing impact of adverse selection, given 
that the latter was found to be quite a substantial proportion of total loadings. Furthermore, the 
aggressive annuity pricing is creating public buy-in for the new mandate, while indirectly 
working to compensate less risk-averse individuals in terms of foregone equity premium. One 
offset may be that private insurers have been crowded out, in part because the CPF-designed 
product pays participants more than what commercial insurance companies had offered.  Without 
competition, it is unclear whether annuity pricing will continue to be attractive and whether 
product innovation will continue in Singapore. Related questions, as yet unsettled, have to do 
with whether favoring annuity payments over payments to survivors is politically sustainable, 
and how long the government will be able to continue subsidizing payouts. 
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Appendix 1: Plot of  (probability of dying between month  and month  
conditional on having survived to month ) 
 
The figure plots  for a random male drawn from the population who purchases an 
annuity at age 55 in 2007. It shows the probability of dying between month  and month  
(conditional on living to month ) increasing from age 55 to about age 95 where the rise in  
outweighs the decline in . In the advanced ages, the opposite occurs and the probabilities fall. 
The jags in the plot indicate that within each year, the probabilities are level consistent with the 
UDD assumption. 
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Appendix 2: Assumptions used in Money’s Worth Computations for Life Annuities under the CPF MS Scheme 
 
Study 
Valuation Date; 
Sample chosen / 
Model 
Mortality Assumption Interest Rate 
Assumption 
MWR for 55-
year-old Male 
Adverse 
selection 
(in pp) Annuitant Population Ann. Pop. 
Fong  (2002) 2000; subset of 8 non-
participating annuities 
& 1 participating 
annuity. 
MWR model with 15-
year certain. 
a(90) with 2-
year setback. 
Limiting age 
used is 109. 
Derived from 1960 
and 1990 Ordinary 
Male and Female 
Lives Tables 
(Singstat). Limiting 
age of 99. 
Flat interest rate 
(proxy by the 10-year 
Government bond 
yield of 4.6%).  0.997 0.986 1.1 
Doyle et al. 
(2004) 
2000; subset of 5 non-
participating annuities 
with a 15-yr guarantee 
period or similar. 
MWR model with 15-
year certain. 
a(90) with 2-
year setback. 
Limiting age 
used is 109. 
Abridged life tables 
for Singapore (World 
Health Organization). 
Limiting age of 100. 
Term structure (yield 
curve with long-term 
rate assumption of 
4.76%). 0.947 0.945 0.26 
This study   2007; all MSS 
annuities: 7 non-
participating & 2 
participating annuities. 
MWR model for 
annuities with 
guaranteed amount; 
see Equation (1) in 
text. 
a(90) with 5-
year setback. 
Limiting age 
used is 117. 
Complete life tables 
for Singapore 
resident population 
2007 (Singstat), plus 
extrapolate from age 
100 to 117. Limiting 
age of 117. 
Term structure (yield 
curve with long-term 
rate assumption of 
3.44%). 
0.947 0.910 3.69 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. 
Notes: A total of 13 MSS life annuities were offered in July 2000 of which 9 were flat-rate annuities, 2 were participating annuities, and 2 were increasing 
annuities. The increasing annuities offered by AIA were dropped after that year (Source: Personal communication from CPF Board). The a(90) table refers to the 
UK a(1990) period life table for annuitants. It is based on UK annuitants’ experience from 1967-70, with mortality improvements projected to 1990. Because of 
lack of annuitant experience in Singapore, previous studies used the a(90) and with a two-year setback to account for lower mortality among annuitants. A two-
year setback means that a 65-year-old is treated as having the same mortality rate as a 63-year-old has in the initial table. Money’s worth ratios are in decimals 
and adverse selection costs are in percentage points. 
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Figure 1 
Cumulative Cohort Survival Probability: General Population and Annuitant groups (conditional 
on attaining age 55 and limiting age of 117; 2007) 
 
A. Singaporean Males  
 
B. Singaporean Females  
 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. 
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Table 1 
Monthly Nominal Payouts for Life Annuities purchased at the Minimum Sum of S$99,600 (2007; 
S$ per month) 
 
 Monthly Annuity payout for entry age of 55  
 Company & Product Male (S$) 
Female 
(S$) 
Guaranteed amount upon death 
(less total annuity payments) 
    
Non-participating Annuities    
Asia Life Assurance 505.47 454.47 Premium.  
American International 
Assurance (AIA) 
530.87 513.94 Premium. 
 
Aviva 559.00 507.00 Premium + accrued interest 
compounded at 1% p.a. to 
commencement date of annuity. 
Great Eastern Life (GE Life I) 535.35 484.30 Premium + interest accumulated at 
0.75% p.a. to age 62. 
Great Eastern Life (GE Life II) 
[Note: This product includes 
long term care benefit.] 
494.26 440.73 Premium + interest accumulated at 
0.5% p.a. to age 62. 
Overseas Assurance 
Corporation (OAC) 
535.35 494.26 Premium + interest accumulated at 
0.75% p.a. to age 62. 
Prudential Assurance 518.44 449.87 Premium. 
Sub-average 525.53 477.80  
    
Participating Annuities    
HSBC Insurance 474.00 
(541.58) 
458.00 
(525.58) 
Premium + interest accumulated at 
2% p.a. to age 62. 
NTUC Income Co-op 523.50 
(591.08) 
490.25 
(557.83) 
Premium + interest accumulated at 
2.5% p.a. and bonuses to age 62. 
Sub-average 498.75 474.13  
    
Overall Average 519.58 476.98  
        
Source: Authors’ computations from CPF (2007). 
Notes: p.a. denotes per annum. Monthly payouts for a nominal deferred annuity purchased at age 55 with payments 
starting at age 62. The single premium is the Minimum Sum of S$99,600 for members age 55 (7/07-6/08).  The MS 
Scheme currently guarantees named beneficiaries a given amount in the event of annuitant’s death equal to the 
(positive) difference between the guaranteed amount and annuity payments made. Previously (in 2000) most MS 
annuities were guaranteed for a certain period so if death occurred during the guaranteed period, remaining annuity 
payments would be converted into a lump sum paid to beneficiaries. Bonus rates depend on company performance; 
NTUC Income’s annual bonus rates were 1-3.5% historically (NTUC 2009) and a 2% bonus is used in NTUC 
Income benefit illustrations. Original payouts without bonus expressed without brackets; figures in brackets 
incorporate bonus component assuming an annual projected bonus rate of 2%. 
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Table 2 
Money’s Worth Ratios and Adverse Selection Costs for Nominal Life Annuities Offered by 
Private Insurers under the CPF Plan (2007) 
 
Company & 
Product 
Male Female 
Population 
MWR 
Annuitant 
MWR 
Adverse 
Selection 
Population 
MWR 
Annuitant 
MWR 
Adverse 
Selection 
Non-participating Annuity     
Asia Life Assurance 0.861 0.896 3.47 0.840 0.885 4.44 
AIA 0.907 0.943 3.62 0.943 0.995 5.20 
Aviva 0.943 0.982 3.98 0.930 0.981 5.14 
GE Life I 0.910 0.947 3.71 0.893 0.941 4.78 
GE Life II 0.846 0.879 3.34 0.818 0.860 4.22 
OAC 0.907 0.945 3.74 0.908 0.957 4.98 
Prudential Assurance 0.879 0.915 3.62 0.833 0.876 4.37 
Participating Annuity         
HSBC Insurance 0.933 0.969 3.59 0.969 1.021 5.20 
NTUC Income Co-op 1.006 1.047 4.09 1.024 1.081 5.61 
Mean 0.910 0.947 3.69 0.906 0.955 4.88 
Source: Author’s computations, see text. 
Notes: Money’s worth ratios are in decimals and adverse selection costs are in percentage points. Computations 
pertain to a CPF participant who purchases the MS Scheme annuity at entry age 55 for a premium of S$99,600 and 
starts receiving payouts at age 62. The term structure of interest rate uses derived spot rates for 1, 2, 5, 7, 10 and 20-
year bonds with linear interpolation between years. 
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Table 3 
Robustness Analysis for Nominal Life Annuities Offered by Private Insurers under the CPF Plan 
(2007) 
 
Panel A: Sensitivity to Alternative Mortality Assumptions 
 
  Male Female 
Mortality rates Annuitant Population AS Annuitant Population AS 
2 years lighter 0.962 
0.901 
6.05 0.972 
0.901 
7.11 
Base case 0.939 3.80 0.951 5.03 
2 years heavier 0.917 1.57 0.929 2.86 
Notes: This analysis uses the average annuity payouts (with bonus) of the private annuities given in Table 1. For the 
base case of 3.44%, the MWR values of this pseudo average-payout annuity are slightly lower than the mean of the 
individual MWR values reported in Table 2 because the individual computations incorporate interest accrued during 
the deferral period where applicable. 
 
Panel B: Sensitivity to Alternative Long-Term Interest Rate Assumptions (±0.5% and ±1%) 
 
Long-term 
interest rate 
Male Female 
Annuitant Population AS Annuitant Population AS 
2.44% 1.067 1.010 5.70 1.110 1.033 7.69 
2.94% 0.998 0.951 4.66 1.024 0.961 6.22 
3.44% (base) 0.939 0.901 3.80 0.951 0.901 5.03 
3.94% 0.889 0.858 3.10 0.889 0.849 4.07 
4.44% 0.846 0.821 2.51 0.837 0.804 3.28 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Table 4  
Illustrative Payouts and Money’s Worth Ratios of CPF LIFE Plans (for a premium of S$67,000; 
various dates) 
 
 Male Female 
LIFE plans 
Monthly 
payout 
(S$) 
Annuity 
component MWR 
Monthly 
payout 
(S$) 
Annuity 
component MWR 
Proposed LIFE plans (as at February ’08)    
Refund 90  560 6% 1.306 540 8% 1.350 
Refund 85 590 13% 1.315 560 16% 1.361 
Refund 80 610 24% 1.331 570 28% 1.371 
Refund 75 630 41% 1.341 580 45% 1.374 
Refund 70 640 66% 1.323 590 68% 1.370 
Refund 65 650 100% 1.284 590 100% 1.311 
LIFE plans (as at June ‘09)    
LIFE Basic 519 6%* 1.264 496 8%* 1.308 
LIFE 
Balanced 556 24%* 1.313 515 28%* 1.355 
LIFE Plus 590 100% 1.308 531 100% 1.332 
LIFE 
Income 632 100% 1.287 549 100% 1.313 
LIFE plans (as at September ‘09)    
LIFE Basic 524 8.6% 
1.240 
[1.099] 500 13% 
1.255 
[1.088] 
LIFE 
Balanced 
561 30% 1.252 [1.110] 520 35.5% 
1.270 
[1.098] 
LIFE Plus 594 100% 
1.315 
[1.149] 535 100% 
1.340 
[1.142] 
LIFE 
Income 
636 100% 1.294 [1.119] 553 100% 
1.322 
[1.118] 
Source: Authors’ computations; see text. Payout data obtained from CPF website (CPF 2008 and CPF 2009e).  
Notes: The default plan offered at each point in time is bolded. Computations pertain to a CPF participant who joins the 
LIFE plan at age 55 for a premium of S$67,000, and starts receiving payouts at age 65. In particular, the parameter inputs 
generating this set of illustrative payouts in the CPF web calculator assume the Singaporean worker was born June 1958 
(so he is age 55 in 2013); AV=“More than S$11,000”; AI=“More than S$54,000”. The premium paid is split into a term 
component and an annuity component. The term component funds payouts from age 65 to the vesting age; vesting age 
differs across plans. The annuity component, expressed as a percentage of the annuity premium, funds payouts from the 
vesting age to death. The reported payouts are indicative only; actual payout will depend on actual CPF interest rates and 
mortality experience. CPF interest is computed monthly, reviewed quarterly and, compounded and credited annually. 
Figures marked with (*) are estimated. Money’s worth ratios are computed using the riskless term structure of interest rate 
with long-term interest rate assumption of 3.44% and assume constant payouts over the participant’s lifetime. The 
assumed CPF interest rate is 4% with the statutory additional 1% paid on the first S$60,000. The guaranteed amount 
refunded to the beneficiary upon the annuitant’s death is the unused amounts left in the annuitant’s CPF retirement 
account (term component plus any interest earned) and the unused amount of the annuity component (if refundable). 
MWR in brackets [ ] are based on an alternative long-term interest rate assumption of 4.44%.   
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Table 5 
International Comparison of Money’s Worth Ratios 
 
Country Study 
Valuation 
Date 
MWR (65-year old 
male; annuitant 
mortality) 
Cost of Adverse 
Selection as % of 
Total Loading 
US Friedman and 
Warshawsky (1988) 
1983 0.868 35.0% 
US Mitchell et al (1999) 1995 0.916 54.3% 
UK a Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002) 
1998 
1998 
0.988 
0.962 
91.1% 
62.0% 
Singapore Fong (2002) 2000 0.933 13.0% 
Singapore Doyle et al (2004) 2000 0.947 4.7% 
Australia Doyle et al (2004) 2000 0.939 49.7% 
Singapore b This study 2007 0.947 41.1% 
  2008 - 2009 1.10 - 1.15 - 
Source: Authors. 
Notes: All the MWR values reported for Singapore are based on a 55-year old male instead of a 65-year old male. 
Total loading is defined as one minus money's worth of annuity for an individual from the general population. 
a Results are reported in separate rows for the U.K. voluntary, and compulsory, annuity markets respectively. Data in 
both markets are drawn from annuities offered by commercial insurers. 
b Results are reported in separate rows for annuities offered by commercial insurers, and new annuities offered by 
the CPF Board, respectively. MWR values for the latter are based on September 2009 LIFE plan payouts and a long-
term interest rate assumption of 4.44%.   
 
 
